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Large scale distributed systems consist of workstations, mainframe comput-
ers, supercomputers and other types of servers, all connected by a computer net-
work. These systems are being used in a variety of applications including the
support of collaborative scientific research. In such an environment, issues of
access control and privacy arise. Access control is required for several reasons,
including the protection of sensitive resources and cost control. Privacy is also
required for similar reasons, including the protection of a researcher's proprietary
results.
This report describes a possible architecture for integrating available com-
puter and communications security technologies into a system that meets these
requirements. This architecture is meant as a starting point for discussion,
rather than the final answer.
Work reported herein was supported by Cooperative Agreement NCC 2-387 from the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to the
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1. BACKGROUND
As advanced computing capabilities are deployed and made available to
large numbers of scientific researchers through both local and remote access, a
number of issues of privacy and access control will arise. Among these issues are
providing privacy of data (e.g., to protect early "sensitive" technical results),
controlling access and use of valuable resources including both supercomputers
and networks themselves, protecting remote resources in a shared environment
(such as the experimental environment envisioned for the space station), and
preserving privacy of communications such as electronic mail.
Systems such as the NSFnet are made up of various workstations, termi-
nals, supercomputers, networks and users. The requirements for privacy and
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access control in such distributed systems and the architectural approaches to
provide them are not well understood. Many building blocks to provide privacy
and access control are either available or will be soon, including link and end-to-
end encryption mechanisms, secure computer systems, software encryption
mechanisms for both file encryption as well as mail, etc. However, the require-
ments themselves are not understood; even less is known about how to connect
systems in a way that satisfies the requirements.
For example, a scientific team of the future will work in an environment
that has a local area network, several workstations with each shared by several
scientists and support personnel, a main frame computer, and access to a wide-
area network, allowing interconnection to other teams as well as special
resources such as a supercomputer. Subteams working on a particular experi-
ment will want to share certain data as well as have remote access to this data
via the wide area network in order to coordinate activities between groups at dif-
ferent institutions working on a cooperative experiment. Remote access might
also include the need to access and control remote experiments such as those on
platforms like a space station. Some information (such as team planning docu-
ments) will be shared by the entire team, while other information will have to be
kept private for personnel and similar reasons. The scientists will want to use
electronic mail and similar facilities to share selected information with collabora-
tors at other sites. They will also want to be able to use special resources when
necessary. At those sites with shared resources, individual teams' information
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must be kept separate and managed appropriately.
Furthermore, the privacy and integrity of this information must be main-
tained while in transit over the network. Appropriate access control mechanisms
must limit access to the networks, the centralized resources and the local team
resources. This all must be done in an environment consisting of the intercon-
nection of a large number of local (probably private), regional, and wide area
(probably public to a defined community) networks.
In the above example, we have emphasized the need to keep data private.
Other requirements include assuring the integrity of the data (of particular
importance in controlling remote experiments) and providing access controls to
remote resources. It is clear from this example that, while the building blocks
are probably available to satisfy most of the requirements outlined, it is neces-
sary to create a system architecture out of these building blocks to satisfy these
requirements.
2. A Possible Architecture
The following sections describe a possible architecture for satisfying the
requirements for access control and privacy in large distributed systems. We
start by summarizing a number of available technologies that can be brought to
bear on this problem. We then describe how these technologies can be combined
to satisfy the requirements.
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It must be emphasized that the architecture described here is a starting
point for discussions and does not represent a final design. We feel that develop-
ing such an architecture will require the cooperation and interaction of scientists
and technologists in this area, and this paper is meant to start that discussion.
2.1. Available Technologies
There are two areas of technology providing measures of privacy and access
control: communication protection and computer mechanisms. As we will see,
this division is not clean. We now discuss each of the mechanisms available, and
how they relate to an overall privacy and access control architecture.
2.1.1. Protected Wire Distribution Systems
A fairly common method for protecting communications in the past was
simply to protect the wires that connect the various components. For example,
terminal lines to a central computer can be protected to prevent an unauthorized
user from connecting a terminal to the line.
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2.1.2. Encrypted Links
Protecting wires is feasible in a small area. For remote access, encryption of
the links is often used. As an example, link encryption boxes based on the
National Bureau of Standards (NBS) Data Encryption Standard (DES) [l] are
available to encrypt all data passing over the wire. These systems require a key
to be inserted at both ends of the link, and then one of several modes of the DES
[2] is used to encrypt the data. Thus, an unauthorized user is able to neither
read nor insert data passing over the link. He might, however, be able to record
and retransmit encrypted data unless adequate safeguards are built into the pro-
tocols.
2.1.3. End-to-End Encryption
Protected or encrypted links require that the nodes at the ends of the link
o
be secure. Techniques of end-to-end encryption (E ) have been developed to
avoid the need to protect every node in a network, and also to be able to parti-
tion information between distinct hosts. These normally use a separate device
attached between the network and the hosts or other network being protected.
Data flowing through the box is examined to determine the desired destination
and other information required for routing; this "network information" is passed
through unchanged. The user data (and certain header information) is
encrypted using a key known to the similar box at the destination. The data is
not decrypted until it arrives at the destination E device.
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Two general techniques are available. The first technique establishes a com-
munity of devices, and all devices in the community share a single key. There-
fore, any device (and its users) have access to all information being transmitted
among devices in the community. The second technique uses more sophisticated
key distribution algorithms and allows pairs of the devices to be keyed dynami-
cally, with a single key being shared by only the source and destination devices.
With such a system, no other devices would have access to the user data.
2.1.4. Restricted Computers
One of the easiest ways to protect a computer is to permit access only to a
small set of trusted developers, users and maintainers. This is appropriate for
computers dedicated to specific tasks such as packet switching and access con-
trol.
2.1.5. Isolated Computers
Similarly, user data can be protected by allowing electronic and physical
access only to a set of authorized users. The computer would not be connected
to a network and would not have dial-up lines. The physical access points would
be protected.
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2.1.6. Password Protection
Most computer systems rely on a combination of user identification codes
(user names) and passwords to authenticate users. Protection of access to a
machine and data within that machine thus relies on protection of passwords. A
typical method for protection of passwords is to store them only in encrypted
form. Other methods are being developed such as the system by Sytek that
allows for a cryptographically verified challenge-response, with the challenge-
response pair being changed each time it is used.
2.1.7. Distributed Operating Systems
Considerable research is being carried out in the area of distributed operat-
ing systems. Much of this work is in naming and accessing resources in a distri-
buted system. Much of the difficulty with using the above technologies to pro-
vide the required access control and privacy lies in providing distributed and
authenticated naming.1 Research in distributed operating systems is expected to
contribute to solutions to this problem.
'This topic wu discussed at the DARPA Ditlrikuted Operating Syitcm Workihop held December 16-17, 1985, at
Carnegie Mellon University
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2.2. The Problem of Distributed Systems
As seen above, there are a number of technologies that can be brought to
bear on the problems described in Section 1. The difficulties lie not in develop-
ing new technologies, but rather in developing, installing and using an architec-
ture that can exploit those technologies.
Figure 1 shows a typical distributed system architecture. A user is at his
terminal or workstation. In the case of a terminal, he is connected to a local
host computer by direct line, dial-up line, or terminal local area network. The
local host computer may be a true host (that is, it supports user applications) or
may be used solely for the purpose of accessing a network.
Located at various places on the system are server devices. These include
mainframe computers, supercomputers, data bases, file servers, and experimental
facilities. In some cases, the devices are located on the same LAN as the user
and in others they are located remotely. '
Furthermore, users may access the system from several places. When in
their offices, they may use the same LAN to which their primary host computer
is connected. While on travel, they may have to access their primary host com-
puter remotely.
The networks providing long haul communications fall into two basic
classes. First, there are commercial networks which base charges on usage.
Second, there are special purpose networks designed to support some limited
community (such as the Defense Data Network does for the DoD) and which do
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Commercial
Network
Community
Network
H - Host
WS - Workstation
SC - Supercomputer
TS - Terminal Server
FS - File Server
G - Gateway
Figure 1: Distributed Systems Architecture
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not charge based on use. Rather, the charge is borne by the supporting organi-
zation (such as the DoD) as an overhead cost, but access to such networks is
limited to those users permitted by the organizations. Although the overall
internet architecture currently allows ubiquitous access and connection, such a
policy would not work when a large number of networks, each designed to sup-
port a portion of the community, are connected to each other. Clearly, access
control policies and procedures will be required.
Operating in such an environment in a way that satisfies the access control
and privacy constraints requires an architecture that makes full use of the tech-
nologies available. It may also require the development of additional technology
(although at this time this is not expected to be significant).
Some of the requirements for such a system are as follows:
r
1. Protect information while in transit between host computers.
2. Protect information while in transit between a user device (workstation
or terminal) and a host computer.
3. Protect information on the various host computers and throughout the
system (including the various file servers and database servers.)
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4. Support private communications between users (confidential electronic
mail between collaborators for proprietary results, for example.)
5. Control access to sensitive data.
6. Control access to server resources on the network, including databases,
file servers and supercomputers.
7. Control access to networks, allowing only authorized users to use them
(even for transit traffic).
8. Control access to private resources, such as experimental facilities or
personal files, even when such resources are accessed remotely.
2.3. A Possible Distributed Architecture for Access Control and
Privacy
A distributed access control and privacy architecture is required to accom-
plish the goals described above. Figure 2 shows a possible system architecture.
There are two differences between the architectures of Figure 1 and Figure 2.
The first is that E devices have been added. The second is that a number of the
elements of the system have additional functions, such as the access control func-
- 11-
Distributed System Privacy March 7, 1986
LAN—
SC SC SC
Commercial
Network
Community
Network
I I I I
ws ws ws ws KDC
H - Host
WS - Workstation
SC - Supercomputer
TS - Terminal Server
FS - File Server
G - Access Control Gateway
E - End to End Encryption Device
KDC - Key Distribution Center
Figure 2: Distributed Access Control and Privacy Architecture
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tion added to the gateways.
The architecture is divided into two components, related to the degree of
protection in the local environment and the long-haul environment. Typically, a
local environment will provide at least a limited amount of protection to both
the communications and the data resident in a single machine. Thus, providing
protection in the local environment is usually cheaper and simpler than in the
long-haul environment. Furthermore, in many environments (such as the
NSFnet), the local site is responsible for providing protection in the local
environment, while other organizations (such as the NSF) are responsible for
protecting information in transit between sites and protecting the long-haul
resources themselves.
2.3.1. Local Communications Protection
In the local environment, protected distribution systems guard information
and access. This means that the local site is required to provide a sufficient level
of protection to the local physical means of distribution by protecting the wires
and host computers.
For those users needing greater local protection, the mechanisms used in
remote protection can be applied, with the resulting increase in cost and com-
plexity. For example, E devices may be used between workstations on an
unprotected LAN.
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2.3.2. Remote Communications Protection
The major changes to the architecture are in the long-haul system. E dev-
ices are used to protect information in transit between local environments. One
or more key distribution centers provide for overall coordination and control of
the encryption devices.
Access control gateways will permit use of the network only if the packet is
sent by a user in the class of authorized users. To do this, the local environment
would be responsible for setting the correct access control flags in the Internet
Protocol (IP) header. One possibility is to use Type of Service Options for this
purpose. Another is to use the evolving IP Security Option. The important
point is that for gateways to deal effectively with the access control, the Internet
header must contain the appropriate information.
This implies a certain degree of trust in both the IP header and the gate-
ways. Thus, it must be possible to verify and authenticate the IP header, and to
trust the gateways. One way to build such gateways is to use technologies such
as the restricted computers described above.
This also implies an effective and trusted method for distributed registra-
o
tion of users and resources. This is most apparent when considering the E dev-
ices and key distribution centers (KDC). For a KDC to know that a particular
source/destination pair should be permitted to communicate (and therefore
given a key), a reliable and trusted method must exist for identifying and
authenticating the source and destination. Such a method is also required for
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the access control gateways to be effective. Gateways to transit networks (net-
works not directly connected to either source or destination) must have a
method for reliably identifying that a packet associated with a particular pair of
users is authorized to use that transit network. Thus, the local environments of
those users must be able to authenticate that the users belong to the authorized
class, and pass that authentication along to the gateways in a reliable and
trusted way. The research in distributed operating systems is expected to shed
light on this problem, but further work will be required to provide the necessary
authentication mechanisms.
3. Summary
This paper has given a quick sketch of a possible architecture to provide
access control and privacy. Clearly, developing and refining a suitable architec-
ture will require considerable additional effort. We hope that this paper will
help stimulate the necessary discussions and research to satisfy the important
requirement of providing suitable access control and privacy in large distributed
systems.
- 15-
Distributed System Privacy March 7, 1986
References
1. Data Encryption Standard, Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC (1977).. Federal Information Processing Standards Pub. 46
2. DES Modes of Operation, Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC (1980). Preliminary copy of Federal Information Processing Standards
- 16-
RIACS
Mail Stop 230-5
NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035
(415) 694-6363
The Research Institute for Advanced Computer Science
is operated by
Universities Space Research Association
The American City Building
Suite 311
Columbia, MD 21044
(301) 730-2656
